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Abstract 
We examine the long-run performance of firms emerging from financial distress in Malaysia. 
The sample consists of 114 companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia stock exchange that 
emerged from a financially distressed classification between 2001 and 2014. We investigate 
whether post-distressed performance is similar to the performance of firms of equivalent size 
and book-to-market ratio. The results suggest that firms emerging from financial distress in 
Malaysia underperform when compared to the performance of firms similar in size and book-
to-market ratio. This suggests that the post-restructuring performance of firms on the Bursa 
Malaysia stock exchange that have emerged from financial distress does not improve. 
 
Keywords: long-run performance; Malaysia; buy-and-hold abnormal return; cumulative aver-
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This study investigates the post-restructuring performance of restructured companies. It ad-
dresses whether the existing regulations governing companies in distress effectively improves 
the condition of financially distressed companies or simply helps poorly performing companies 
to survive. If the restructuring exercise is biased toward the continuation of unviable companies, 
poor performance will persist even after the companies emerge from the restructuring period. 
The efficiency of the Chapter 11 U.S. bankruptcy code has been extensively debated in the 
literature. Hotchkiss (1995) argues that Chapter 11 reorganization promotes the continuation of 
inefficient or unviable companies by providing these companies the opportunity to reorganize, 
which lead to “chronic inefficiencies” (Hotchkiss, 1995). In addition, Gilson (1997) postulates 
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that the reorganization process delineated in Chapter 11 is substantially focused on facilitating 
the emergence of firms with high debt.  
A considerable amount of research literature has investigated the post-bankruptcy perfor-
mance of restructured companies, with mixed empirical findings. Several studies have revealed 
that post-bankruptcy performance is generally poor because of weak accounting performance, 
high debt ratios and the ongoing need for debt restructuring (Komera and Lukose, 2013; Gilson, 
1997; Hotchkiss, 1995; Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1997). On the other hand, the study by Eber-
hart et al. (1999) demonstrates that there are significant positive excess common stock returns 
for companies emerging from Chapter 11, as shown by the average abnormal returns, which 
range from 24.6% to 138.8% in the 200 days following emergence. Conversely, Alderson and 
Betker (1999) demonstrate that reorganized companies neither underperform nor overperform 
following Chapter 11 reorganization. More recent evidence offered by Jory and Madura (2010) 
supports a study by Alderson and Betker (1999) which revealed that the post-bankruptcy stock 
performance of reorganized companies is similar to the performance of companies similar in 
size and book-to-market ratio.  
There are several motivations for conducting this study. Most of the previous empirical stud-
ies were almost exclusively based on failure cases in the United States, which are regulated 
under the United States bankruptcy legislation. The United States is, in fact, the most debtor-
friendly bankruptcy regime in the Western world (Coelho, 2008; Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). 
As such, it would be interesting to extend the findings uncovered in the previous empirical 
studies on financial distress in Malaysia where the law is more creditor-oriented. Apart from 
the legal setting, there are major differences between the United States and Malaysia in terms 
of governance and institutional settings, suggesting that the US empirical evidence in this area 
may not be applicable to Malaysia. Claessens, Djankov and Klapper (2005) demonstrate that 
the diverse structure of bankruptcy laws is due to differences in institutional background. Sim-
ilar to elsewhere in Asia, Malaysia has a high concentration of ownership where the mean share-
holdings of the single largest shareholder are 31 percent and those of the five largest sharehold-
ers of companies are 62 percent (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Further evidence found by La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) reveals that the United Kingdom, United States and Japan 
have low ownership concentration. Thus, using Malaysia as a context of study could provide 
us with an ideal setting and uncover further evidence about the behaviour of high ownership 
among large shareholders as compared to the dispersed ownership structure in the United States. 
This has led to studies of corporate failure which tend to be country-specific since the causes 
of corporate failure and the strategies undertaken during restructuring may differ according to 
the country context. Recently, Wang (2012) undertook a comparative study to examine the role 
of institutional factors (bankruptcy codes and judicial efficiency) in the decision to resolve 
bankruptcy through reorganization and liquidation, finding that the legal origin of the bank-
ruptcy code is important for determining the choice of either reorganization or liquidation.     
In Malaysia, financially distressed listed companies are governed by Practice Notes 17 (pre-
viously was Practice Notes 4) and Guidance Notes 3 to improve their financial condition in 
order to remain listed entities. Open questions remain pertaining to whether firms emerging 
from a financially distressed condition outperform when compared to their counterparts. Uti-
lizing 114 firms emerging from financial distress that were listed on the Bursa Malaysia stock 
exchange from the period spanning 2001 to 2014, the empirical evidence suggests post-emer-
gence declines among these companies over the three-year period following their emergence, 
irrespective of the methodological approach employed.  
The organization of this study is as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methodology, 
and Section 3 discussing the empirical results. Section 4 concludes the study. 
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2. Data and methodology 
The search for financially distressed companies commences at the beginning of the Practice 
Notes 4 in February 2001 and continues through Practice Notes 17 and Amended Practice Notes 
17 until 31 December 2014. Publicly listed companies’ announcements regarding effective 
emergence dates are observed. As has been the case in previous studies, financial institutions 
and real estate and insurance companies have been excluded from the study, since the account-
ing presentations of their financial statements are significantly different from those in other 
sectors.  
A sample of matching or control companies is constructed in accordance with each of the 
financially distressed companies that has emerged using specified firm characteristics. Accord-
ing to Barber and Lyon (1997), using the matching companies approach could eliminate new 
listing bias, rebalancing bias, and the skewness problem. In addition, it could generate well-
specified test statistics in all of the situations being considered, which eliminates bias in the 
residuals that may affect abnormal returns in the holding period (Campbell et al., 2009). For 
each of the financially distressed companies, based on the similar trading avenue (either Main 
Market or ACE Market), a pool of potential matching companies is sought, with market size 
(market capitalization) closest to that of the distressed company selected according to the mar-
ket size of matching companies. For market size and market-to-book value1 matching size, the 
Euclidean distance procedure is used to select the closest match to that of the distressed com-
pany. This could be done by transforming the size and market-to-book value into z-scores by 
subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. The closest matching firm is de-
fined as the firm with the smallest Euclidean distance to the sample firm in the two-dimensional 
space of z-scores. The next closest Euclidean distance matching firm is selected if it is delisted 
before the three-year period. 




























































where MVp: market value of emerged firm p in the month prior to the month of emergence; 
MVi: market value of firm i; MTBVp: market-to-book value of firm emerged p in the month 
prior to the month of emergence; and MTBVi: market-to-book value of firm i. 
The analysis of share price performance starts on the day of the company’s emergence from 
the Practice Notes or Guidance Note up to three years from the emergence date. If the company 
is under trading suspension, the analysis begins from the first day of trading after the suspension 
is lifted due to the emergence from the Practice Notes or Guidance Note. The event month [t=0] 
for this study is set as the end of the month in which outcomes of distress are announced. A 
number of methods are used to ensure that consistent and robust results are obtained throughout 
the analysis since the results can be influenced by the methodology (Gompers and Lerner, 
2003). Without hesitation to compare the weakness of the methods, standard long-run event 
study methods – namely, cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) – and buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) are employed to make inferences regarding the long-run share per-
formance of the restructured companies over the three- year period.  
 
                                                 
1 Market-to-book value is calculated as the company’s market value divided by the book value of the companies 
at the end of the month of the emergence outcomes announcement. 
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 2.1. Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
The abnormal return of company i in the event month t is computed as follows: 
tbtiti RRAR ,,, −=  (2) 
where Ri,t is the raw return of company i in the event month t and Rb,t is the raw return of 
matching company b in the event month t. 








=  (3) 
The CAR (cumulative abnormal return) from 1 to 2  is calculated by cumulating the 
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The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) from period 1 to 2  can be obtained by 
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The t-statistics on the significance of CAAR are computed as follows: 
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is the cross-sectional standard deviation of abnormal return on event month t.  
2.2. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) 

















tii RRBHAR  (8) 
where ),( 21 iBHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for company i from time 1 to 2 , tiR ,
is the raw return for company i at time t, and 
tbR ,  is the return from a matching or control 
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where ),( 21 iBHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return of company i from period 1 to 2 , and 
N is the number of companies with valid BHAR over time period 
1 to 2 . 
Drawing on the work of Loughran and Ritter (2000), the present analysis emphasizes the 
equally weighted return. This is due to the fact that value-weighted returns can overstate 
standard errors, leading to low power in detecting abnormal performance. Two procedures are 
employed to determine the statistical significance of the mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
First, standard cross-sectional t-test statistics (similar to CAAR analysis in the previous section) 
are utilized, and second, the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted return t-statistics are employed. 









































= , where ̂ is the estimate of the 
coefficient of skewness and Sn is the conventional t-statistics.  
 
3. Empirical results and discussion 
The industry classification of the sample is presented in Table 1. Industrial products and 
trading/services are the industries with the highest number of emerged companies which 
account for 25 percent respectively. The properties industry accounts for 14 percent of the 
sample, followed by construction (11%), technology (10%), consumer products industry (6%), 
plantations (6%), infrastructure project companies and hotels with two percent and one percent, 
respectively. 
3.1. Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
The results in Panel A of Table 1 show that the CAARs are negative and statistically significant 
at a minimum 10% significance level for five event windows2. The CAARs from the six-month 
period is -8.82%, and this decreases gradually to -18.62% by the third year3. This suggests that 
the emerged companies significantly underperform relative to the size-matched companies for 
the entire three-year window. The parallel median abnormal returns also display similar 
findings, further supporting the mean abnormal returns result. Furthermore, Panel B shows the 
results using the sample matched based on size and market-to-book value. The mean CAARs 
are all negative for all periods, but significant mean abnormal returns are reported for the six-
month, one-year, 18-month and two-year periods. The average CAARs reported -9.56% (p < 
0.10) for the six-month period, -11.16% (p < 0.10) for the one-year period, -14.74% (p < 0.05) 
for the 18-month period, and -13.78% (p < 0.10) for the two-year period. Using CAARs, these 
findings suggest that the emerged financially distressed companies experience abnormally 
negative returns when compared to companies sharing either a similar size or both a similar 
size and market-to-book value.  
 
                                                 
2 Since most of the financially distressed companies in the sample trade at prices below RM1.00 per share, extreme 
outliers are taken into consideration by winsorizing the sample at the 1% level at both tails to reduce the impact of 
low-priced stocks on the skewness of ex-post returns (Kausar, Taffler and Tan, 2009).  
3 CAARs and BHARs using the EMAS index return and KLCI index return as the market return report similar 
results to those using the matching companies approach, although of larger magnitude. The results can be obtained 
upon request. 
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Table 1. Sample description. 
Distribution by industry  
Technology 11 
Industrial Products 29 
Trading/Services 29 





Infrastructure Project Company (IPC) 2 
Total 114 
 
Table 2. Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs). 
Event period Mean abnormal 
returns (%) 
t-statistics Median abnormal 
returns (%) 
z-statistics 
Panel A: Matched with size 
3 months -0.56 -0.1396 -2.86 -0.735 
6 months -8.82 -1.9078* -11.50 -2.177** 
1 year -12.69 -1.9569** -14.91 -2.036** 
18 months -16.67 -2.4241** -18.63 -2.451*** 
2 years -19.94 -2.4323** -20.62 -2.252** 
3 years -18.62 -1.7345* -20.78 -1.861* 
Panel B: Matched with size and market-to-book value 
3 months -3.36 -0.8132 -5.43 -1.158 
6 months -9.56 -1.8996* -9.93 2.388** 
1 year -11.16 -1.7518* -12.58 -2.302** 
18 months -14.74 -2.1068** -20.58 -2.465*** 
2 years -13.78 -1.7773* -22.04 -1.927** 
3 years -7.77 -0.8198 -9.72 -0.972 
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively, using a two-tailed test. The Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test is used for the median. 
 
The estimation results are indirectly compatible with the research of Hotchkiss (1995), who 
found that 40% of firms emerging from Chapter 11 continue to experience operating losses in 
the three years after emergence, and nearly a third of these firms require a second bankruptcy 
filing or distressed restructuring. In addition, Komera and Lukose (2013) demonstrate that 30% 
of the companies continue to report negative operating performance in the post-bankruptcy 
period using a sample of listed companies in India. Moreover, our results are consistent with 
the findings of Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997), Gilson (1997), and Komera and Lukose 
(2013). Komera and Lukose (2013) find that the mean returns range from -28.41% to -31.26% 
for up to 12 months after emergence from bankruptcy.  
3.2. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) 
The results in Panel A of Table 2 show that the BHARs are negative for all holding periods 
except for the three-month period, which is similar to the findings of the CAARs previously 
discussed in Table 1. The negative and significant BHARs of -10.81% (p < 0.05), -14.84% (p 
< 0.05), -17.80% (p < 0.01), -24.24% (p < 0.01) and -30.33% (p < 0.01) are produced in the 
six-month, one-year, 18-month, two-year and three-year holding periods, respectively. The 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics reaffirm the statistical significance of the standard 
cross-sectional t-test statistics. The results indicate that on average, investors who buy shares 
in emerged financially distressed companies in the month that these companies have been 
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declared “healthy” and hold them for a three-year period will generate significant negative 
abnormal returns. Similarly, the corresponding median abnormal returns of five periods (except 
the three-month period) are negative and statistically significant. 
Panel B shows the results of using the sample matched based on size and market-to-book 
value. The reported long-run underperformance is significant at a minimum 10% significance 
level for five holding periods. The highest underperformance of -29.15% is found in the three-
year holding period. As can be observed, the BHARs and CAARs display similar patterns, with 
post-emergence performance declining over the three years after the companies have emerged 
on the Bursa Malaysia exchange. In conclusion, the returns are negative irrespective of the 
approach employed to calculate the abnormal returns and the matching procedure employed, 
although it is worth noting that the findings are moderately sensitive to the methodological 
approach employed. 
 
Table 3. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). 
Event period Mean abnormal 
returns (%) 
t-statistics Median abnormal 
returns (%) 
z-statistics 
Panel A: Matched with size 
3 months -3.10 -0.8310 -0.77 -4.00 
6 months -10.81 -2.3979** -2.14** -11.74 
1 year -14.84 -2.3728** -1.91* -16.70 
18 months -17.80 -2.8534*** -2.49*** -18.65 
2 years -24.24 -3.5966*** -3.42*** -23.33 
3 years -30.33 -3.3924*** -2.96*** -22.01 
Panel B: Matched with size and market-to-book value 
3 months -3.84 -1.1052 -1.02 -6.51 
6 months -8.93 -1.7903* -1.35 -13.62 
1 year -14.16 -2.5613*** -2.00** -16.40 
18 months -17.38 -2.9796*** -2.51*** -27.12 
2 years -17.56 -2.0381** -1.49 -19.48 
3 years -29.15 -2.7410*** -2.70*** -15.21 
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively, using a two-tailed test. The Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test is used for the median. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This study examined whether firms emerging from a financially distressed condition 
outperform when compared to their counterparts. The evidence suggests that post-emergence 
performance declines over the three-year period. This implies that companies emerging from 
financial distress demonstrate unfavourable performance, even though they have been classified 
as “healthy” by the stock exchange regulator. The returns are negative irrespective of the 
approach to calculate the abnormal returns and the matching procedure employed. This shows 
that investors do not believe that the companies have successfully restructured their financial 
condition and, thus, do not consider the emerged companies in their investment portfolio. In 
this sense, attention should be given to these formerly financially distressed companies to 
determine the reasons for declining share price performance when companies have been 
allowed to continue to be listed following the restructuring process. Regulators should 
strengthen the evaluation process for financially distressed companies in determining if they 
are allowed to be relisted. In this sense, a fair avenue of investment could be better ensured.  
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